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A B S T R A C T
This research note addresses an increasingly popular topic 
in the EU literature, namely the measurement of policy
preferences in the Council of Ministers. It aims to provide
conclusions on three issues: (1) what data are in fact avail-
able from the Council, (2) how preferences are measured 
in other legislatures, and (3) whether these methods would
be suitable for analyses of Council members’ preference
positions given the available data. Applying the popular
scaling method NOMINATE and a Bayesian MCMC model to
a data set consisting of all legislation adopted by the Council
in 1999–2004, it is found that, although the two methods
show similar voting patterns at the general level, the failure
to report standard errors by NOMINATE in particular proves
to be a severe problem when trying to identify individual
governments’ policy location. Conversely, the Bayesian
approach provides a convincing method for analyses of
Council decision records and is easily extended to include
more advanced empirical information than merely the
governments’ decisions to support or oppose a proposal.
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Introduction
Empirical investigations into voting behaviour and preference locations of
members in the European Union’s (EU) Council of Ministers1 have recently
become a popular topic in the academic EU literature. Yet, although the field
is still in its infancy, much disagreement has already emerged over appropri-
ate methods of measurement. In some cases different studies have even
presented contradictory evidence on the same issues, owing to a difference
in research methods and underlying assumptions about the actors’ preference
configurations.
This research note wishes to discuss and provide conclusions on three
issues: (1) what data are in fact available from the Council, (2) how pre-
ferences are measured in other legislatures based on decision records, and 
(3) whether these methods would also be suitable for analyses of Council
members’ preference positions given the available data. Two popular methods
are considered in detail, namely a Bayesian simulation approach and the
NOMINATE scaling method technique. When applying these methods to a
large data set covering all legislation adopted from January 1999 to May 2004,
it is found that a Bayesian model offers several attractive possibilities for
measuring the governments’ revealed preferences. NOMINATE is less
convincing in its results, mainly owing to the failure to report standard errors
around the governments’ ideal point estimates. The simulation-based Bayesian
Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) model implicitly addresses such issues
and furthermore makes it possible to advance the analysis to include factors
other than merely the voting outcomes. These aspects are particularly valuable
in the complex Council scenario, where it may be of relevance to take into
account also national political effects, vote trading, policy substance or even
changes in the political agenda and institutional set-up.
Existing accounts of conflict structures and preferences
in the Council
The past decade has seen a number of different theoretical models applied to
the EU context in order to assess and analyse the relative impact of EU insti-
tutions, the consequences of the decision rules and, most recently, the effect
of party configurations. The models have come in various forms and are often
presented in a spatial manner (e.g. Crombez, 1996, 2001; Garrett and Tsebelis,
1999; Steunenberg, 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett, 1996) or based on voting power
indices (e.g. Felsenthal and Machover, 1997, 2001; Hosli, 1996, 1999; König
and Bräuninger, 1998; Laurelle and Widgren, 1998; Leech, 2002; Pajala and
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Widgren, 2004). However, common to most of these models is still a lack of
rigorous empirical testing, making it hard to assess the explanatory validity
of each of the models. In particular, the lack of data from the Council has
posed a problem for scholars who have wished to engage with either
positivist or normative evaluations of the Council members’ preferences,
voting behaviour and the consequences of the Council dynamics for EU
legislative processes in general. Nevertheless, the literature has recently come
some way in the empirical investigation of the functioning of the Council and,
similarly to many other policy fields, the increasing number of empirical
studies has started to divide into groups distinguished by a reliance on either
qualitative or quantitative research methods. However, whereas the quali-
tative studies of politics and policies in the Council have indeed provided
important and invaluable insights into the formal and informal processes –
and should of course continue to be a permanent part of the research agenda
– a demand for further quantitative investigations is dominant at this point
in the research process. A recent increase in the accessibility of Council docu-
ments and voting records has started to enable such research, though a
question has now also arisen about whether the information from the Council
is actually suitable for deriving conclusions about behaviour and preferences.
Available data from the Council
Almost every study of Council decision-making begins with a complaint that
the large amount of legislation adopted by unanimity makes it difficult for
outsiders to get a proper insight into the institution. The criticism is well
founded because it is quite difficult to analyse voting in the Council when
between 70% and 95% of all legislation is adopted by unanimity (see Mattila,
2004; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace, 2006). However, such findings result from
analyses of Council members’ behaviour at the very last adoption stage.
Moreover, the data from which those results are derived are usually collected
from the Council’s monthly summaries or the summarized minutes, which
provide only the title of the policy proposals together with the final
conclusions of the negotiations.
With this focus, other important sources of information may be over-
looked. First, decisions from stages prior to the final adoption stage are now
publicly accessible via the public register of the Council and/or the PreLex
database available on the EU website.2 This means that the restriction of
studies of voting behaviour to final stage decisions is no longer necessary
and, to put it frankly, perhaps not even legitimate. At the adoption stage the
governments decide whether to accept or to reject a proposal altogether,
whereas the earlier stages can be assumed to include negotiations over the
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content of the policy. Furthermore, the member states’ voting behaviour may
change in accordance with the exchange of information and strategies that
prevail throughout the different stages of negotiations. Therefore, voting
behaviour can be assumed to be different at the final adoption stage compared
with prior readings, and hence it becomes of great importance to include
decisions from earlier stages as well. Second, Council members often make
formal statements following the adoption of a proposal, and these formal
statements may reveal yet another level of contest in the Council. The formal
statements indicate a country’s disagreement with the policy and are often
included even in cases where it may not have been expressed through formal
voting. Or the formal statements are included in order to highlight country-
specific standards related to the policy that a member state wishes to bring
to the attention of other Council members or external actors. The first case is
of course quite interesting from a political science perspective, because it
requires some explanation why governments want to state their opposition
after the adoption of a proposal or a common position, yet chose not to do
so by formal voting.3
The above points are obviously not made to suggest that taking into
account every legislative stage as well as the formal statements will solve all
issues of transparency and provide full information about Council members’
preference positions. The Council still adopts a large number of decisions by
a high degree of recorded consensus, and the only formal accounts are the
releases of the common position and related statements in the minutes of
meetings held behind closed doors in the respective Council formations.
Hence, it is difficult to evaluate any possible effect of political signalling or
vote trading or whether the outcomes are in fact a product of preference align-
ments. Nevertheless, the point here is that the picture drawn in the current
literature may not fully capture the data available from the Council; most
scholars prefer to highlight what is not available.
But exactly what information is it possible to obtain regarding Council
members’ behaviour and preferences based on decision records? From the
minutes of individual Council meetings it is usually possible to get infor-
mation on the following issues related to policy proposals:
• the procedure,
• the date of introduction,
• the date of adoption,
• A and B points,
• the policy area (as categorized by the General Secretariat, preparatory
bodies and the Commission),
• the title of the proposal,
European Union Politics 8(2)2 8 2
• details about the policy content,
• an inter-institutional reference number,
• Sectoral Council,
• the stage of the legislative process when the vote was taken,
• the stage of the legislative process when the proposal was adopted,
• the identity of the member holding the presidency, and
• each country’s decision to
(a) support,
(b) abstain,
(c) oppose, and/or
(d) make a formal statement. Formal statements are either included in
the minutes or posted separately on the Council’s website.
As mentioned, information on each of these points is available across the
legislative stages. Combined with related information regarding, for example,
voting outcomes in the Council’s working groups or the European Parlia-
ment’s plenary,4 the conclusion must be that data are indeed available on
several important aspects of legislative politics in the Council.
Biased results?
Using the above-mentioned data is of course only of interest if the recorded
information from the Council provides an adequate picture of what goes on
between the governments. Obviously, it does not make sense to draw any
conclusions on the basis of decision outcomes if the individual governments’
decisions do not reflect their preferences. And there are reasons to believe that
the Council figures may be somewhat biased. First, opposing the majority is
very costly in the Council because a member is more or less excluded from
any further negotiations on a policy proposal once it states its opposition.
Members will always be present at the negotiating table, though if a country
decides not to join the majority coalition, it will not be considered in the
construction of an agreement. The only exception is, of course, if the member
is in the favourable position of being the pivotal legislator. In this case the
threat to oppose is in effect a threat to veto and hence ensures inclusion.
Second, the distribution of vote shares and the qualified majority voting
(QMV) requirement make opposition by any single member in effect
irrelevant to the policy outcome, most likely resulting in a tendency for
members to oppose the majority only when there is a strong reason to do so.
The decision actively to oppose may therefore be owing to a need to send
signals to either internal or external actors. Conversely, this also means that,
when a member decides to voice its disapproval, such a statement can be
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interpreted as representing profound disagreement with the common
position. The cost of going against the majority is simply too high unless there
are very strong reasons to do so. In sum, conclusions drawn on the basis of
recorded oppositions in the Council should hence be reliable; it is the 
underlying causes for the votes in favour of proposals, however, that are
inconclusive.
Besides the relative certainty with which one can rely on the votes cast
in opposition to the majority, another advantage of analysing minutes from
individual Council meetings is that they include all decisions adopted. It
would of course make the coding much easier if one could rely on records of
roll-call votes similar to those from the European Parliament (e.g. Hix et al.,
2007). However, voting records often include only a sub-set of the votes,
which may have different characteristics from the full population of decisions.
Hence, one advantage of quantitative analyses of data from individual
Council meetings is that there is no risk of selection bias from analysing
minutes as there is from analysing voting records if these do not cover all
decisions made (Carruba et al., 2006). Furthermore, and as mentioned above,
the Council minutes also make it possible to take into account members who
do not wish to oppose by voting but who make strong points against a
proposal in a formal statement. Similarly to disagreement expressed through
voting, the formal statements can also be assumed to indicate Council
members’ sincere opposition to a vote since they cannot directly affect the
proposal in question but mainly serve the purpose of stating a position.
Hence, apart from elevating the figures for recorded disagreement, including
the formal statements in analyses of decision records may indeed provide
another step in the direction of more accurately capturing the conflict
structures in the Council.
Measuring revealed preferences in the Council
How are legislators’ preferences best measured? And which methods of
measurement are suitable for analysing the information available from the
Council? Researchers across the social sciences have undertaken a plethora
of efforts to put the measurement of individuals’ preferences on a firm footing.
Yet there is not one final answer as to which method provides the most
appropriate framework for such analyses. And the purpose of this research
note is certainly not to undertake a full literature review and evaluation of
the field. However, one recently developed method in particular appears to
be a particularly interesting and convincing method for measuring actors’
preferences in the case of the Council. The method is based on a Bayesian
model for ideal point estimation and is a very convincing alternative to other
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current and popular statistical methods of ideal point estimation such as
NOMINATE and Optimal Classification (OC) (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997).
Similarly to NOMINATE and OC estimates, the Bayesian MCMC method is
concerned with the positioning of actors’ ideal points (Davis et al., 1970).
The reason why it is important to find an appropriate method for esti-
mating actors’ ideal points is that the distribution of ideal point estimates
indicates how legislators behave and which cleavages shape the policy space
within which the legislators act (see Clinton et al., 2004; McCarty et al., 2001).
Both the scaling method techniques and the Bayesian approach have proven
substantively to advance insights into the legislative dynamics in other
decision-making bodies and would allow for rigorous testing of the long list
of predictions derived from the current literature’s models of governments’
voting behaviour and preferences in the Council.
A Bayesian method for analysing preferences in the Council
Scaling method techniques such as NOMINATE and OC have become in-
creasingly popular for estimating legislators’ ideal points and, subsequently,
for making inferences about the policy space of a given legislative assembly
(Hix et al., 2007; Morgenstern, 2004; Poole, 2005; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997;
Rosenthal and Voeten, 2004; Schonhardt-Bailey, 2003; Voeten, 2000). However,
at the same time that these methods are being applied to more and more
empirical data sets, it is also becoming increasingly apparent that these
methods suffer from both statistical and theoretical deficiencies (Clinton et al.,
2004; Lewis and Poole, 2003).
The main criticism is that standard errors are not reported when
generating ideal point estimates in either NOMINATE or OC, which makes it
impossible to draw conclusions about the variance around the estimates.
Consequently, a concern arises regarding whether the estimates are indeed
consistent and provide fully reliable results (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997; Lewis
and Poole, 2003; Jackman, 2001). Therefore, although these scaling method
techniques have indeed provided important insights into the underlying
structures and into actors’ preferences in a number of legislatures, a recently
developed Bayesian model seems more attractive because it includes estimates
for both actors’ ideal points and the issues voted upon, as well as reporting
the standard errors around the estimates. Additionally, the model as described
below can easily be extended to take into account more complex behavioural
assumptions such as the number and nature of underlying dimensions,
apparent party coalitions, determinants of legislator preferences, and the
evolution of the legislative agenda. This may be particularly interesting in the
complex setting of the Council where institutional, national and/or party
political factors may have an impact on governments’ voting behaviour. This
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makes it generally inappropriate to use estimates of extant methods – usually
generated under the assumption of sincere voting – to test models embody-
ing alternative assumptions (e.g. vote trading) (Clinton et al., 2004: 355).
The standard model is characterized as follows.5 Whereas spatial voting
models usually include deterministic utility functions, the Bayesian model
takes into account that in empirical analysis it is often more convenient to
choose a parametric specification for the utilities and to add a stochastic
disturbance (Poole and Rosenthal, 1997). Here, the utility function is assumed
to be quadratic for legislators with normal errors. (For other examples see
Heckman and Snyder, 1997; Poole and Rosenthal, 1997. See Clinton et al.,
2004, for a comparison of the different specifications.) Assume that the data
consist of n legislators voting on m different roll calls. Each roll call j = 1, . . . ,
m presents legislators I = 1, . . . , n with a choice between a ‘Yes’ position ζj
and a ‘No’ position ψj, and locations in Rd, where d denotes the dimension
of the policy space. Let yij = 1 if legislator i votes ‘Yes’ on the jth roll call and
Yij = 0 otherwise. As mentioned, legislators are assumed to have quadratic
utility functions over the policy space, Ui (ζj) = –  xi – ζj 2 + ηij, and Ui (ψj)
= –  xi – ψj 2 + νij, where xi ∈ Rd is the ideal point of legislator i, ηij and νij
are the errors or stochastic elements of utility, and  ·  is the Euclidean norm.
Utility maximization implies that yij = 1 if Ui (ζj) > Ui (ψj) and Yij = 0 other-
wise. The specification is completed by assigning a distribution to the errors.
Here, the assumption is that the errors ηij and νij have a joint normal distri-
bution with E(ηij) = E(νij), var(ηij – νij) = σj2 and the errors are independent
across both legislators and roll calls. It then follows that 
P(yij = 1) = P(Ui (ζj) > (Ui (ψj))
= P(νij – ηij <  xi – ψj 2 –  xi ζj 2)
= P(νij – ηij < 2(ζj – ψj)xi + ψjψj – ζj ζj)
= Φ(βj – αj),
where βj = 2(ζj – ψj)/σj, αj = (ζj ζj – ψjψj)/σj, and Φ(·) denotes the standard
normal distribution function. This corresponds to a probit model with an
unobserved regressor xi corresponding to the legislator’s ideal point (a logit
model results if the errors have extreme value distributions). The coefficient
vector βj is the direction of the jth proposal in the policy space relative to the
‘No’ position.
Since it is assumed that there is independence across legislators and votes,
the likelihood is
L((B, α, X|Y) = (xiβj – αj)yij  (1 – Φ(xiβj – αj))1 – yij,Φ
j
m
=
∏
1i
n
=
∏
1
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where B is an m x d matrix with jth row βj, α = (a1, … , αm), X is an n x d
matrix with ith row xj, and Y is the n x m matrix of observed votes the (i,j)th
element yij. Then, rather than adopting certain restrictions and having to
calculate appropriate starting values such as is done in NOMINATE and OC
(Poole, 2005), the Bayesian approach treats the unknown ideal points and
other parameters as random variables and conditions upon the observed roll-
call data. A brief, non-technical explanation of the procedure is the follow-
ing: the fundamental difficulty in roll-call analysis is that everything other
than the votes is unobservable. The ideal points, bill parameters and utilities
are unknowns. But, if it were possible to impute values to the bill parameters
and utilities, then the ideal points could be estimated by regression. By the
same logic, if it were possible to impute values for the ideal points and
utilities, the bill parameters could also be estimated by regression. The MCMC
algorithm repeatedly performs these imputations and regressions, starting
from an arbitrary point and alternating between simulation of the ideal
points, bill parameters and utilities. Under a wide set of conditions (e.g.
Tierney, 1996) MCMC algorithms are guaranteed to generate samples from
the posterior density of the model parameters, regardless of where in the para-
meter space the algorithm is initialized (Clinton et al., 2004: 357).
Applying NOMINATE and an MCMC model to Council data
I described the Bayesian MCMC model in the simplest possible form above.
In this section I will present the results from applying the MCMC algorithm
to a large data set consisting of all legislation adopted by the Council from
January 1999 to May 2004.6 I will also present the findings from running the
data with NOMINATE and compare the suitability of the two methods for
analysing the data.
I collected the data set used for producing the findings in this section
from minutes of individual Council meetings7 and the sources described in
previous sections. In other words, the data cover all decisions from each stage
of the legislative process, and also include the formal statements following a
vote on 932 pieces of legislation. A government expressing serious concerns
about a decision or stating direct disagreement in the formal statements has
been treated as if it opposed the majority. The number of legislative decisions
in the 1999–2004 period totals 1281 and results in (15  1281 =) 19,215
individual votes.8
Figure 1 shows Council members’ ideal point estimates based on MCMC
calculations using the ‘MCMCpack’ written by Martin and Quinn (2005).
Figure 2 shows the ideal point estimates as measured by NOMINATE, and
Table 1 presents the goodness-of-fit of using NOMINATE with the data set.
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Figure 1 Governments’ ideal point estimates, 1999–2004: MCMC.
Notes: AU1: First government of Austria in the 1999–2004 period.
AU2: Second government of Austria in the 1999–2004 period.
BE1: First government of Belgium in the 1999–2004 period.
BE2: Second government of Belgium in the 1999–2004 period.
DK1: First government of Denmark in the 1999–2004 period.
DK2: Second government of Denmark in the 1999–2004 period.
FI1: First government of Finland in the 1999–2004 period.
FI2: Second government of Finland in the 1999–2004 period.
FR1: First government of France in the 1999–2004 period.
FR2: Second government of France in the 1999–2004 period.
GER: The government of Germany.
GRE: The government of Greece.
IR: The government of Ireland. 
IT1: First government of Italy in the 1999–2004 period.
IT2: Second government of Italy in the 1999–2004 period.
LU1: First government of Luxembourg in the 1999–2004 period.
LU2: Second government of Luxembourg in the 1999–2004 period.
NE1: First government of the Netherlands in the 1999–2004 period.
NE2: Second government of the Netherlands in the 1999–2004 period.
PO1: First government of Portugal in the 1999–2004 period.
PO2: Second government of Portugal in the 1999–2004 period.
SP: The government of Spain.
SWE: The government of Sweden.
UK: The government of the United Kingdom.
A first thing to note from the reported results is that the Aggregate
Proportional Reduction of Error (APRE) values for NOMINATE show that
61% of the votes are classified in the first dimension by this model. Compared
with the other above-mentioned research projects relying on NOMINATE, the
method does not seem to perform quite as convincingly with this data set,
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Figure 2 Governments’ ideal point estimates, 1999–2004: NOMINATE.
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Table 1 Data fit of NOMINATE
NOMINATE: NOMINATE:
Dimension cumulative % explained APRE
1 53.499 .611
2 58.128 .442
3 62.043 .463
4 66.837 .679
5 67.593 .628
6 69.239 .702
8 71.082 .641
9 72.735 .502
10 73.844 .546
although a significant part of the votes is still captured by the scaling method.
Including further dimensions from the NOMINATE outputs, and thereby
increasing the percentage of votes classified by the method, does not count
as a suitable way of getting NOMINATE to perform better either;
NOMINATE can deliver outputs for any number of specified dimensions, yet
this does not of course result in a better fit with the data if those dimensions
are measured with high uncertainty, as might be the case here. In fact, since
the MCMC method produces an output only for the number of dimensions
it is able to estimate correctly, and since it can be observed here that MCMC
does not even produce an output for any higher number of dimensions,
accurate specifications are probably not possible above the first dimension at
all with this data set. Indeed, the NOMINATE results in Figure 2 do not
appear to include any ‘readable’ voting patterns in the second dimension
either. Hence, it can be deduced that, according to the recorded behaviour,
Council decision-making is actually one-dimensional.
Turning to the content of Figures 1 and 2, it should be noted that countries
that in the years 1999–2004 had more than one government are represented
in the figures with their acronym followed by either a 1 or a 2 depending on
whether it is the first or the second government’s ideal point estimate.
Although the intention of this research note is not to provide an empirical
analysis of voting behaviour in the Council but rather to discuss the suit-
ability of the ideal point estimation methods, two observations should be
mentioned from the findings. First, the fact that both Figure 1 and Figure 2
show distinct ideal point estimates for two governments from the same
country indicates that a government change means a change in behaviour in
the Council. Second, and probably related thereto, it is interesting to observe
that the governments that are commonly assumed to promote centre-left or
left-wing policies are all located towards the centre-left of the policy spectrum
in the first dimension in both figures. Conversely, governments from a centre-
right or right-wing background are almost all located towards the right-hand
side of the picture. In other words, it appears as if both the NOMINATE
results and the findings from the MCMC model indicate more of a party
political divide than a cleavage based on geographical location or other
national characteristics. Considering the complex Council scenario and taking
into account previous findings from the literature, this result is rather
interesting and probably deserves more attention in future empirical analyses
of minutes from the Council.
The results generated by the two methods hence appear quite similar
with regard to the number of policy dimensions and to governments’ overall
voting patterns: although the order of some countries changed from the first
dimension in the NOMINATE findings to the order reported in the MCMC
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results, the same groups of governments are still found on either side of the
policy centre. However, from Figure 1 it is obvious that there are reasons to
be cautious about the interpretation of the governments’ ideal point estimates.
The density curves show that the ideal point estimates have a high level of
standard errors and the large area covered by each government in many cases
makes it difficult to distinguish between governments adjacent to one another
along the identified policy dimension. In particular, the governments located
towards the extremes appear to have large standard errors, at the same time
as several of the more centrally located governments are almost undis-
tinguishable in their location in the policy space. These issues are not apparent
in the densely estimated NOMINATE points, and a general concern therefore
arises whether the method is at all useful with these data. Inferences about
specific locations, such as the location of individual governments’ ideal points
or the exact location of the median position of the Council or that of the
pivotal member(s), become especially problematic with these large confidence
intervals around the estimates.
Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the relationship between the results from
the two methods, and here it becomes evident that the high level of standard
errors is challenging: the correlation between the estimates produced by the
two methods is only moderate. Hence, the overall conclusion must be that,
although one could reach similar conclusions regarding voting patterns in the
Council by using either NOMINATE or the MCMC model when looking only
at the order of governments’ positions along the first dimension, the criticism
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Figure 3 Correlation between NOMINATE and MCMC estimations of governments’
ideal points.
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of NOMINATE discussed in the first section is confirmed in the empirical
results presented here. In particular, the failure to report standard errors
causes somewhat misleading results and the MCMC output makes it clear
that the order of governments’ positions along the first dimension is not
entirely accurate, at the same time as it is almost impossible to distinguish
between some Council members’ preference points.
As a very last point for the further research agenda I should mention that
the above Bayesian model is easily extended to include more empirically
advanced information. As already explained, it is possible to add different
effects to the specification, for instance in the form of party effects, vote
trading or policy substance.9 Future research may choose to include, for
example, assumptions about policy dimensions, the location of extremist
legislators, coalition configurations between certain governments or the
evolution of the legislative agenda. In particular, the possibility of incorpor-
ating coalition formations or political signalling into the model, by making
the utility of one legislator dependent upon either the utility or the voting
behaviour of another, may be hugely interesting when considering the empiri-
cal findings presented in this research note. Furthermore, it is even possible
to permit ideal point estimates to change over time by modelling the process
associated with change. Thus, the Bayesian method can make the study of
data from Council minutes a way to test theoretically interesting and more
informed and sophisticated models of legislative behaviour than have been
used in the Council setting so far. Together with more extensive data sets, this
could certainly be considered a convincing way of solving some of the empiri-
cal and theoretical contradictions in the current literature and advancing our
current knowledge.
Conclusion
In this research note I have discussed the literature engaged with the
measurement of policy preferences in the Council. I have made one general
recommendation and one specific suggestion regarding the further advance-
ment of existing knowledge on this issue.
On a general note, it is necessary to make more use of the data that are
already available from the Council. The current literature has certainly
provided important insights into the institution, but much about the Council
dynamics remains to be explored. The information already available from the
Council makes it possible to conduct rigorous quantitative analyses across all
legislative stages and procedures, and also to take into account formal state-
ments as a means of voicing opposition. Hence, the way forward from the
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current position seems to be more quantitative tests of theoretical predictions;
fortunately, this suggestion appears to be a motivation shared by many other
scholars in the field.
My specific recommendation in this research note is related to the basic
questions of how to address the issue of measuring governments’ policy
preferences and subsequently deriving inferences about the policy space
within which the Council members act. These topics are of great importance
to further research on legislative politics within the Council as well as in the
inter-institutional setting and will most likely appear on the research agenda
for a long time to come. The Bayesian model I presented in this research note
provides a convincing method for addressing the issues. Unlike the densely
estimated NOMINATE ideal points, a Bayesian model provides both in-
dividual ideal point estimates as well as standard errors around these
estimates. The application of the two methods to a data set consisting of
voting data from individual Council meetings and covering all legislation
adopted by the Council from January 1999 to May 2004 showed that, owing
to the high level of standard errors in the data from the Council, NOMINATE
fails to identify correct ideal points for some governments. A Bayesian
method is not affected by such characteristics and instead merely reports the
ideal point estimates with large confidence intervals. Therefore, the Bayesian
MCMC model presented in this research note performs better in terms of the
accuracy of the ideal point estimates as well as when trying to assess the
relative positions of governments positioned adjacent in the identified policy
dimension. These characteristics are particularly valuable in view of the chal-
lenges posed by Council information, and I hope the results and suggestions
made here can serve as an inspiration for new ways to address the measure-
ment of preferences and conflict structures in the Council.
Notes
1 Hereafter referred to as ‘the Council’.
2 http://www.europa.eu.int/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en. See also http://www.
europarl.eu.int/oeil/search.jsp. In order to follow the policy through the
various steps in the process it is sufficient to know the COM reference number
of the initial Commission proposal for the PreLex database, the complete title
of the proposal or the inter-institutional file number for the public register of
the Council. The inter-institutional file number will provide all the documents
linked to the same proposal/dossier (also from working groups) and can be
found through PreLex (when the COM number is known) or at the top of the
page of a Council document.
3 In a forthcoming study I investigate the use of voting and formal statements
before and after the 2004 enlargement. The findings are that, although the
Hagemann Applying Ideal Point Estimation Methods 2 9 3
period immediately following the enlargement saw a decrease in opposition
both through voting and through formal statements, the figures have been
on the increase since the beginning of January 2005, particularly for formal
statements. Please refer to my forthcoming report for the Centre for European
Policy Studies, ‘Decision-making in the Council of Ministers: An evaluation
of the consequences of the 2004 enlargement’, January 2007.
4 http://www.europarl.eu.int/oeil/search.jsp.
5 The following presents a brief and very simplified description of the basic,
statistical model as developed by Clinton et al. (2004). For a more rigorous
explanation and comparison with other ideal point estimation methods,
please refer to their work. Jackman (2000) and Martin and Quinn (2002), too,
provide important research on this issue.
6 The data set has been extended to include legislation from the post-2004
enlargement until November 2006, but, because the use of voting and formal
rules has changed somewhat in the Council during this time, only the data
from before the enlargement will be included here.
7 http://www.consilium.europa.eu.
8 The data were collected during my PhD studies at the London School of Econ-
omics and are used in the empirical chapters in my thesis ‘Decision-making
in the European Union’s Council of Ministers’, as well as in a number of
research papers. The relevant data and commands for obtaining the results
in this research note are available upon request from s.hagemann@lse.ac.uk.
9 See also Clinton and Mierowitz (2001) on this last point.
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